Political Corrections

with Mungo MacCallum

An Old Chestnut sets the Clichés Loose

In spite of the largely manufactured uproar in the media, the most serious criticism that can be levelled at Mark Latham's promise to bring the troops home from Iraq is that it was politically unnecessary.

The government was already on the defensive, if not actually on the run, over its treatment of Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty. Suddenly its own chosen ground of national security had turned into quicksand. The sensible course was to leave it to wallow.

But Latham went in for the kill - in fact, for the overkill. Labor, he announced, would have the diggers home for Christmas. John Howard and his dwindling band of loyalists seized the line, to use the rather florid words of premier Bob Carr in another context, like a starving timber wolf falling upon a bloody lump of meat in a snowy forest.

In fact, when Latham first made the suggestion, it was in fairly moderate terms; the withdrawal would only come after Australia had fulfilled its responsibilities, a deliberately vague timetable which left plenty of wiggle room.

But once the dogs of war started howling and the hawks began to crap on his head he deleted the fine print. The exit date would be when the new, "independent" Iraqi administration took office; no ifs and no buts. Suddenly the measured exit strategy could be portrayed as a policy of cut and run - and so, of course, it was.

It is interesting that very few of the subsequent attacks on Latham were based on whether the policy would be good or bad for Australia; they were almost entirely in terms of what someone else may or may not think.

Leading the charge was the never-has-been, never-will-be, Liberal Ross Cameron, who was able to tell us that Osama bin Laden was all but orgasmic over Latham's decision. The American Ambassador, Tom Schieffer, complained in Howardian language of "the wrong signals" and was duly reported by a compliant Australian media - although why the view of one of George Bush's property developer bagmen should determine Australian policy was never made clear.

Commentators duchessed over the years by Washington, such as Paul Kelly in the Australian, said that no American president could possibly approve. Howard and his disgrace of a Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, said that the Americans wouldn't like it and Osama bin Laden would, so by definition it was wrong, wrong, wrong.

Howard also quoted, with approval, a defence academic who suggested that the proposed withdrawal would increase the threat to Australia by encouraging terrorists to exploit our perceived lack of resolution. Well, hang on a minute. If, as Howard insists, our active participation in the invasion of Iraq didn't increase the risk of becoming a target, it is hardly logical to claim that withdrawing an insignificant number of non-combatants is likely to move us up the hit list.

And on a rather more sophisticated level, if our foreign policy is to be driven entirely by what we think that the Americans might think that the terrorists might think, aren't we still letting bin Laden set the agenda? At the very least the attacks on Latham are not entirely rational.

But it cannot be denied that they have a certain emotional clout. Running for cover - walking out on our allies - leaving the job half done - giving in to terrorism. In the short term at least, the slogans will not be easy to counter. "Bringing the troops home" is a good rallying cry, but when there are very few of them, they are not suffering casualties and there is no obvious urgency, it doesn't really work.

Latham's explanation that they are needed to defend Australia is simply risible. Are we so short of air traffic controllers, embassy guards and analysts of non-existent weapons of mass destruction? The argument that they are a token presence cuts both ways. If they are not really needed in Iraq (and they're not) then they're not really needed on the home front either. This is not 1942, and Latham should not pretend to be John Curtin.

So Howard has been granted a much-needed breathing space to trumpet the old line that Labor is soft on terrorism. But in the longer term it may rebound on him; one thing that has emerged is just how limited our commitment to Iraq actually is (although it still looks pretty good compared to the real front line in the so-called war against terror: Afghanistan, where our total contingent is exactly one - yes, one - officer.)

It is also increasingly obvious that the great war of liberation has left Iraq in a bloody mess, and there is little if any sign of it becoming less so in the foreseeable future. Sooner or later even the most dedicated coalition supporter will have to admit that our 250 defence personnel, only a handful of whom are actually involved in peacekeeping activities, are doing not much at all and that if we are serious about rebuilding Iraq there are better (and far less divisive) ways to go about it.

And finally, of course, the unravelling of the whole rationale behind the invasion of Iraq is now all but complete - particularly in the United States - which is of course why Washington is so keen to keep Australia and anyone else it can get its claws on involved. Iraq is rapidly becoming a political four-letter word.

Some months ago, Howard himself suggested that it was time to move on. Latham may just have pre-empted him. But the fact remains that the tactic was reckless and the timing was terrible.